Last week, news sources reported a story about a divorce proceeding in Germany between a Moroccan married couple. The wife, beaten regularly by her husband, filed for a speedy divorce in the German court system (where there is usually a year-long waiting period) on the grounds that her husband regularly abused her. Though the judge arranged for a restraining order and separation, she refused to grant a divorce on the grounds that physical abuse against wives is permitted in the Koran, and the couple in question were two practicing Muslims from a Muslim nation.

The woman continued to be threatened with death and abuse by her husband after the separation, according to the wife’s lawyer.

This case and the judge’s ruling are deeply flawed for a number of reasons, not least of which is the problem of using religious custom of any sort to decide legal matters. Though Germany operates under a different legal code and constitution than the United States, the fundamental principles are the same: the law must protect individuals from harm uniformly, irrespective of any potential cultural traditions of violence.

Though the judge may have been in the right for waiving the year-long waiting period based on German law, her reasons for not granting the divorce are legally and socially irresponsible, and mostly likely highly theologically uninformed.

Muslim leaders in Germany seemed to be appalled by the ruling, not only because they believed that law should come before the Koran, but because the judge’s interpretation of the Koran is highly controversial. These objections, though important and relevant to understanding the role of judges and the law in western society, seem to be secondary to the larger and more subversive problem of rulings and opinions similar to this one.

The past half-century has seen the widespread development of cultural relativism, political correctness and “tolerance” as primary and governing social principles. We are taught, and perhaps should be, that it is important to be understanding and accepting of other cultures and their practices. This normally includes not making fun of other cultures’ food, language, clothes, religion, etc.

But somewhere, lines must be drawn: if it is true that Muslims or Moroccans or Arabs “culturally” condone domestic abuse, is accepting this fact the same as accepting the food they eat or the language they speak? I don’t think so.

The problem with this ruling and the attitude behind it is that it makes two fundamentally wrong assumptions: one is that Muslim men are violent towards their wives. The second is that because this is part of their religious culture, it should be legally respected and upheld in secular society.

Both of these are completely dangerous ways to approach culture. Though violence is not always taboo in Western and “developed” democracies, as the torture debate in the United States has shown, there are certain universal and fundamental principles and rights that should always be legally respected, no matter what culture, religion, or perspective is presenting opposite views.

These principles center on one fundamental fact: if the law does anything, it should protect us from physical harm, or allow us to protect ourselves.

Cultures which condone physical violence should not be accommodated by the law, even if they may be allowed colloquially.

Moreover, the law should not presume to correctly interpret religious text as it translates into cultural practice, and if it does correctly understand it, then it should avoid using it as the basis for legal decisions.

This decision, though most likely influenced by the judge’s personal experiences, also highlights the current invasiveness of cultural relativism. It is a good idea generally to be accepting of the world’s many cultures; however, it is an entirely other thing to fail to protect individuals not only because of our own gross misunderstandings of culture, but also the difference between culture and senseless violence.