Champaign County State’s Attorney Julia Rietz charged junior Yafa Issa on July 9, 2024, with a single count of mob action after Issa participated in the pro-Palestine protest near Alma Mater on April 26. Her attorney, Evan Bruno, filed a motion on Oct. 31 to dismiss the charge, citing the state’s application of the mob action statute as unconstitutional.
In the motion, Bruno argued the state’s charge criminalized Issa’s First Amendment right to assemble and associate. Bruno said the April 26 encampment did not breach written University policies at the time and remained nonviolent until confronted by police.
“This motion is important because prosecutions like these have a chilling effect on the First Amendment,” Bruno said. “People should enjoy a robust freedom to protest without worrying that they will be held criminally liable for the conduct of others.”
In a statement to The Daily Illini, first published in the News-Gazette, Rietz said there are restrictions to free speech.
“Speech is absolutely a protected right under the American system of government,” Rietz said in the statement. “At the same time, the American system of government comes with laws and reasonable limitations to preserve order and safety that apply to all citizens — regardless of the opinions they may wish to express.”
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April 26: Protest at Alma Mater
Around dawn on April 26, Issa, who was president of UIUC Students for Justice in Palestine, and a group of approximately 20 people arrived with tents next to the Alma Mater.
These protestors gathered to demand the University divest from the war in Gaza, which, according to an investigation by The Daily Illini, invested at least $27 million in companies that profited from the conflict in fiscal year 2023. Protestors put up tents to serve as a symbolic reference to displaced Palestinian refugees.
Shortly after protestors arrived, University representatives informed the demonstrators they violated policies outlined in the Campus Administrative Manual and would face consequences if the tents were not taken down.
According to WCIA, at 7:28 a.m., University Facilities & Services workers and UIPD officers began removing tents, completing the removal by 8:23 a.m. One arrest was made minutes after the tents were removed.
Around 2:30 p.m., a larger crowd of protestors convened. They reestablished the encampment at 3:15 p.m. as UIPD officers assembled on Wright Street.
At approximately 4:26 p.m., UIPD officers assembled into a “wedge” formation to aid F&S workers in their removal of the tents. The protestors linked arms and formed a circular barrier around the encampment. A struggle ensued.
Amid the chaos, F&S workers and the UIPD removed some tents, but the protestors’ resistance caused the UIPD to retreat less than 10 minutes later.
Police stepped back to “deescalate the situation” and “reduce the risk of injury” for officers or demonstrators, said Chancellor Robert Jones in a Massmail that evening.
July 9: Issa charged with mob action
Issa was charged with violating the mob action statute, 720 ILCS 5/25-1 (a)(1), for her actions on April 26. UIPD used her social media profile, video surveillance and University databases to identify her.
Per the statute, mob action occurs when two or more people engage in the “knowing or reckless use of force or violence” to disturb public peace outside of the rule of law. The crime is a Class 4 felony, punishable with a sentence of one to three years in prison and fines up to $25,000.
The state alleged in the charging document that Issa, along with a large group of people, violated University policy and physically prevented F&S workers from “removing structures erected on University of Illinois property.”
The group did so by “linking arms to form a barrier, physically pushing, pulling and shoving” UIPD officers who were assisting F&S personnel, according to the document, which also alleges protestors used “a sheet of plywood and other objects as shields to push officers away.”
Rietz said the mob action charges reflect the protestors’ violation of the law, not the intention or message of their speech.
“Exercising one’s right to free speech crosses over into criminal acts … when the individual’s physical acts violate a criminal law … regardless of the individual’s purpose or the message the individual is intending to convey,” Rietz said.
Lena Shapiro, professor and director of the First Amendment Clinic in the University’s College of Law, pointed out some of the First Amendment’s limitations.
“What the First Amendment is going to protect is pretty limited to the speech at issue, not necessarily the context,” Shapiro said. “So things like violence, things like blocking students from getting to class, et cetera, those are just examples that won’t be covered under the First Amendment.”
Out of the nine individuals facing charges related to the encampment, three are University students, and eight face the felony mob action charge. In response to these charges, the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union made a statement on its opposition to the mob action law when it was first considered in the Illinois General Assembly.
“We expressed concern at the time that the felony penalties available to prosecutors under this statute would be used against those engaged in protest,” the statement said. “Despite repeated declarations by lawmakers that this was not the purpose, we see this charge now being used in this way.”
Oct. 31: Bruno files motion to dismiss
Bruno’s motion claimed the State’s Attorney’s use of the mob action statute in Issa’s case was unconstitutional.
Since mob action requires two or more people acting together — and because protesters gathered with the purpose of expressing free speech — the state is building a criminal case out of constitutionally protected conduct, Bruno said.
“The State’s Attorney’s application of the mob-action statute … is unconstitutional because it relies on First Amendment-protected assembly and association to satisfy the ‘2 or more persons acting together’ element of the offense, and First Amendment-protect(ed) conduct to satisfy the ‘disturbing the public peace’ element of the offense,” Bruno wrote in the motion.
Although the action of linking arms might not constitute mob action, other physical actions could, Shapiro said.
“When you’re standing there linking arms, and for example, chanting political slogans, that may not necessarily (be) a violation of the mob action statute,” Shapiro said. “So I think the question about this case is: What is she (Issa) actually alleged to have done?”
According to the Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, the First Amendment protects expressive conduct when the behavior is designed to convey a message.
“If (what Issa is alleged to have done) is physical action and conduct, that seems more likely to fall within what the mob action statute prohibits and less likely to enjoy First Amendment protection,” Shapiro said. “If it’s a demonstration, that’s separate.”
In his motion, Bruno also disputed the University and State’s Attorney’s position that the April 26 “structures” erected on University property next to Alma Mater breached the University’s regulations.
Although policies on “Expressive Activity on Campus” and “General Use and Access to University Properties” were amended in August — a University decision criticized by some for having a short feedback period — at the time of the demonstration, campus policies prevented “placement of signs and structures into concrete or grass” on University property without prior authorization. But, policies defining “Outdoor Displays,” or freestanding structures, specifically excluded tents or canopies.
“The demonstration was lawful and non-violent before the police used physical force to break it up in the name of removing the tents,” Bruno said in an email.
Bruno pointed out that even if the University had a policy specifically preventing the encampment, such a policy could be subject to judicial review based on time, place and manner restrictions.
According to Shapiro, the University has the right to impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of First Amendment-protected conduct as long as the restrictions are content- and viewpoint-neutral. These can be used to limit things like amplified sound, structures and the number of people that can be in a particular place.
Time, place and manner restrictions must also serve a narrowly tailored government purpose and leave ample alternative channels to communicate the information.
“Even when engaging in what’s considered … First Amendment-protected activity … a government unit like a university can still implement certain regulations about the speech, provided to subject restrictions, including, most importantly, that it’s content- and viewpoint-neutral,” Shapiro said.
Shapiro also pointed out the nuances of First Amendment protections regarding demonstrations, saying that it’s a topic frequently discussed in courses she teaches.
“These are very difficult questions, particularly the situations that we saw from the demonstration last spring and this fall — and I anticipate there will be many in the semesters to come,” Shapiro said.
The motion to dismiss the charge will be heard by the Champaign County Circuit Court on Jan. 10.
